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At its sitting of 4 July 1973 the European Parliament authorized the 
Committee on Regional Policy and Transport to draw up a report on 
Permanent links across certain sea straits. 
At its meeting of 12 September 1973 the committee appointed Mr James 
Hill rapporteur. 
The committee considered the motion for a resolution and the ex-
planatory statement at its ~eeting of 22 October 1974 when the motion 
for a resolution and the explanatory statement were adopted unanimously. 
The following were present : Mr James Hill, chairman and rapporteur; 
Mr Mitterdorfer, vice-chairman; Mr Creed, Mr Fabbrini, Mr Flamig 
(deputizing for Mr Ariosto), Mr Giraud, Mr Herbert, Mr Kavanagh, 
Mr Marras, Mr Mursch, Mr Nybourg and Mr P~tre. 
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A 
The Committee on Regional Policy and Transport hereby submits to the 
European Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with 
explanatory statement 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on 
Permanent links across certain sea straits 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Policy and 
Transport (Doc. 319/74), 
- referring to the Report of the Committee on Regional Policy and Trans-
port (Doc. 85/73) on the improvement of Traffic Infrastructures across 
1 the Alps, and to its Resolution of 5 June 1973, 
1. Notes that certain sea straits within the Community constitute 
an impediment not only to the development of an inter-connected 
Community transport network, but also to the economic and social 
development of certain regions. 
2. Recognizes that there are already sea and air links in existence 
across these straits but considers that despite such links, certain 
sea straits would be less of an impediment if permanent links were 
created whether by bridge or tunnel. 
3. Considers that the creation of such links would materially reduce 
transport costs and time between: 
- Continental Italy and Sicily; 
- the Danish Islands, the other Community countries, and Sweden; 
- the United Kingdom and other Community countries 
while facilitating in some cases in accordance with the Communities' 
aims the transfer of industrial growth from zones of excessive 
_______ c_o_n_c_entration to regions suffering from structural unemployment. 
1 
O.J. No C.49 of 28.6.1973, p.l2 
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4. Recognizes that while the costs of building permanent sea strait 
links may be high, such ventures are likely to be commercially 
viable if the users pay a fair share of the cost of such 
traffic infrastructures. 
5. Recognizes also that the social effects of new and easier links 
across sea straits are likely to be considerable, particularly 
on the out-lying areas of the Community. 
6. Considers that co-ordination at Community level is necessary when-
ever such projects are being considered, with a view not only 
to assisting, if necessary, in the financing of transport 
networks connected to the new links, but also in planning. 
7. Asks, in the light of the Council Decision of 28 February 1956, 
instituting a procedure for consultation in respect of transport 
infrastructure development,· for: 
8. 
{a) a detailed examination to be undertaken of all projects 
currently under consideration by Member States for the creation, 
of permanent links across sea straits; 
{b) consideration to be given to the probable effects of such pro-
jects not only in connection with actual transport costs 
but also in connection with the effects in social and economic 
terms not only in the areas most immediately affected but also 
in the Community as a whole; 
{c) consideration to be given to the desirability of offering 
financial aid to certain infrastructure proposals for per-
manent sea links which are of priority importance oath within 
the Community and at its bordeFs. 
Instructs its President to forward the rez:olutio:1 and the report of 
its committee to the Council and Commission of the European Communities. 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTORY 
1. This report completes the present study by the Committee on Regional 
Policy and Transport of the main natural obstacles to traffic in 
1 the European Community. In a previous report, the Committee 
analysed in particular the infrastructure problems created by the 
Alps, reserving for a separate report the consideration of bridges 
or tunnels across sea straits. In this report the Committee re-
examine the question with particular reference to the Channel 
Tunnel proposal linking France and the United Kingdom, the proposal 
for a link between Sicily and Calabria and the various proposals 
for linking the Danish islands both with one another and with Sweden 
and Germany. 
2. If all the projects under consideration here come to fruition, there 
would be direct transport in Europe running from the north of 
Scotland to Sicily on a north/west/south/east axis, and from Sweden 
to Sicily on a north/south axis. One of the Member States (the 
United Kingdom) would no longer be physically separated from 
the European mainland, and the Scandinavian countries would be 
in direct contact, through Denmark, with the Community (see Annex 1.). 
3. These three areas of investigation cover (a) internal links within 
an individual Member State; (b) links between Member States and 
(c) links between a Member State and a non-Community country. 
4. The Committee have adopted the same criteria in this report as in 
their report on Alpine transport; that is to say they have con-
sidered most carefully traffic barriers necessitating particularly 
high expenditure on transport infrastructures in order to achieve 
the Community's aims as set out in the Preamble to, and Article 2 
of, the EEC Treaty: namely balanced trade, harmonious development 
o.E the economies, the reduction of differences existing between 
1 
Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Regional Policy and Transport 
on the Improvement of Traffic Infrastructure across the Alps. Rapporteur 
Mr Luigi Noe, 4 June 1973. Doc. 85/73 of the Working Documents of the 
European Parliament 1973-1974. 
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the various regions and of the backwardness of the less favoured 
regions (Preamble) , the harmonious development of economic 
activities within the Community, balanced economic expansion and 
closer relations between the Member States (Article 2) . 
5. The Committee stress at the outset the point made in the NOE 
report about the need for joint planning for transport projects 
requiring major investment. 
6. Any project for creating new links across sea straits must be 
considered not only on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis and 
in the framework of a plan for an European traffic infrastructure 
network but also against the follow%g background: 
(i) Whether there are existing sea links in the form of sea or air 
services - and if so what is the likely economic and 
practical result of the creation of a bridge or tunnel on 
the existing links 
(ii) The probable social and economic consequences of the creation 
of a bridge or tunnel on the Member State or States directly 
concerned or on the Community as a whole. 
7. In this report the Committee have confined themselves to the 
projects outlined in paragraph (1) above; projects involving 
heavy expenditure and which prima facie would appear to be 
advantageous both socially and economically. They have not 
considered the possibility of permanent road or rail links with the 
islands of Ireland, Corsica or Sardinia since at the moment 
there appears to be no pra~tica~ pe~sibility for such links 
- ~ - . - '1f1.h., 
being constructed. The committee are however fully aware of the 
problems of communication that arise in connection with these islands 
and they are prepared, in a later report, to consider the question 
of improving the sea and air links between them and the rest of the 
Community. 
B. In some cases, the Committee are aware that the existence of a 
sea strait isolating an is~nd or a piece of land may in itself 
be desirable both economically and socially. The particular 
character of a locality may depend on its comparative isolation 
and this in turn may give rise to advantages concerning tourism 
or to the quality of life of the inhabitants. Examples that 
might be cited where the construction of bridges or tunnels 
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I"""!Uld adversely affect a community, by placing too heavy a strain 
0n transport and holiday resources for instances, are afforded 
by the Isle of Wight in the United Kingdom, or Elba in the case 
of Italy. 
9. Community action in the field of traffic infrastructure investments 
is not yet based firmly in Community legislation. As a result 
1 
of the Council Decision of 28 February 1966 there is little 
more scope in this field than for a procedure for consultation; 
Article 1 of the Decision only requires Member States to notify 
the Commission of "investment projects of Community interest 
particularly where regional policy is concerned." Article 2 provides 
that when considering such projects account shall be taken of their 
effects "on the development of one or more regions of the Community". 
In the committee's view, it is essential that the Commission should keep 
itself constantly informed of the developments that are taking place in 
this field and should consider the economic and social consequences 
that such developments will create and their effect not only 
regionally but in the Community as a whole. 2 
10. To take the Channel Tunnel as an example, not only will its con-
struction lead to a through rail connection which will be capable 
of linking industrial areas in the United Kingdom with industrial 
areas in Germany but also it is likely to have profound effects 
upon road traffic. The Committee have noted with interest the 
proposals of the "Interconsular and Interdepartmental Centre of 
Action for the improvement of the Calais-Bayonne axis through 
the R.N. 138." This association which was created three year::: 
ago is seeking to improve the Route Nationale 138 in an effort 
to provide a North-South road link which would take heavy traffic 
and would avoid Paris. The association feel that such a link 
which would help to reinvigorate some of the mid-west regions 
of France will "become indispensable as one of the most important 
continental openings for the coming tunnel under the Channel." 3 
11. The Commission consider that Common Transport Policy must take 
into account the co-ordination of investment in transport infra-
1 
2 
3 
OJ 42, 8 March 1966, p. 583 
In its recent Communication on the Development of the Common Transport 
Policy (Doc. 226/73), the Commission has stressed the need for such 
projects as the Channel Tunnel Scheme to be placed "within the frame-
work of general infrastructure programmes and examined from the 
standpoint of the Community's transport needs." 
Axe Calais-Bayonne, Chambre de Commerce et d' Industrie C! 'A 1.~""'50"'. 
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12. 
structures. 
The formal notification required un~the 1966 procedure 
has only been received by the Commi&~ion in the case of the Channel 
Tunnel project in November 1973. No information concerning the 
Danish or Italian projects has so far been received by the 
Commission. The Commission has informed the other Member States 
of this notification and has asked the French and United Kingdom 
Governments for further technical information concerning: 
(a) the technical compatibility of the proposed transport system 
under the channel with existing systems; 
(b) the financial profitability of the scheme; 
(c) the economic profitability in the wider framework of the 
economies of the Member States, and the economic consequences 
on ports and air traffic; 
(d) the access routes, both road and rail, to the tunnel. 
I I . THE CHANNEL TUNNEL l 
13. Since Mathieu's project in 1802 lhere have been various schemes 
for constructing a tun~el under the Channel between France and 
the United Kingdom. The idea of a bridge rather than a tunnel 
has also received support. As long ago as 1875, an Anglo-French 
qonsortium actually bored lengths of trial tunnel at Dover and 
Sangatte. In 1938 M. Baschwart proposed a road tunnel, changing 
this scheme to a road and rail tunnel in 1939. However, despite 
the fact that the geology of the area posed comparatively few 
problems, even to the technology of a hundred years ago, the 
various projects came to nothing largely for military reasons, 
the United Kingdom in particular seeing the advantages of pre-
1 
se~ving the Channel as a defensive barrier of great value particularly 
when coupled with a strong naval force. Throughout the nineteenth 
century the volume of traffic across the channel continued to 
grow rapidly. 
Much of the information in this section is derived from the United 
Kingdom Command Paper 5430 "The Channel Tunnel"; the statistics 
in that document are mainly based on A~glo-French cooperation. 
- 10 - PE 36. 642/fin. 
14. It was not however until 1955 that the United Kingdom government 
announced that earlier considerations against a tunnel were no 
longer valid and shortly after this serious Anglo-French ex-
plorations of the possibility of constructing a tunnel or a 
bridge started. In 1963 a Working Group of British and French 
officials reported on these proposals 1 This body concluded 
that either a bridge or tunnel was technically feasible, but for 
reasons of price, danger to navigation and legal difficulties 
it considered that a tunnel was preferable. The Working Group 
also recommended, for reasons of cost, that the tunnel should 
be for railway only and, for technical and legal reasons, 
should be bored rather than constructed as an immersed tube. 
15. In 1964 the French and British Governments announced their 
agreement in principle to the construction of a rail Channel 
Tunnel, subject to further discussion of the legal and 
financial problems involved. In 1966 the two governments announced 
details about the financing of the construction of the Tunnel 
and in 1972 parallel agreements between the governments and the 
members of the Anglo-French group chosen to finance and construct 
the Tunnel were signed. 
The completed tunnel will be 32 miles long and 23 of the miles 
will be under the sea. With completion of the tunnel envisaged for 
1980, the programme has been divided into three Phases 
Phase I covering the main financial, economic and technical 
studies; 
Phase II the initial works; 
Phase III the main construction of the Tunnel. 
Allowance has been made for the abandonment of the project at any 
time and by any party, and detailed arrangements have been worked 
out to cover the consequences of such abandonment according to 
various circumstances. The project is now in the second Phase. 
1 
"Proposals for a Fixed Channel Link": 1963 Cmnd. 2137 HMSO 
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Channel Traffic and Financial Viability 
16. Reference has already been made to the ever increasing volume 
of cross-Channel traffic. Between 1962 and 1971, for example, 
the number of road vehicles (which for the most part com-
prised private cars) has nearly tripled, representing an annual 
increase of 13.4%; in 1971 the total passenger traffic between the 
United Kingdom and the Continent amounted to some 24 million. 
This figure is expected to double between 1971 and 1980 and 
again from 1980 to 1990, whether a tunnel is built or not. It 
has been estimated that about 15 million passengers might use 
the tunnel in 1980, this figure again doubling by 1990. 
17. Freight traffic between the United Kingdom and the Continent 
is increasing at about 8% a year and by 1980 it is estimated that 
it will amount to some 13 million tons, rising to over 25 million 
tons by 1990. 
18. Bearing in mind this volume of traffic and assuming that the Tunnel 
is to be operated as a viable commercial undertaking in com-
petition with existing means of transport, and assuming also, 
at 1973 prices, that the total cost of the tunnel will be £464 1 
million, of which each country will pay half, provisional 
forecasts show a return of about 17% (see below para. 24). 
Technical Details 
19. The "Tunnel" would in fact consist of three tunnels, two single 
track rail tunnels separated by a service tunnel which would be 
linked to the main tunnels at intervals of about 250 yards. 
1 
These cross passages would not only provide access to the main 
tunnels and serve the evacuation of passengers in emergencies, 
but they would also serve for ventilation and nullify the "piston 
effect" caused by the passage of trains through a tunnel at 
speeds of up to 140 km/h. In addition, the main tunnels would 
be linked by a number of crossovers so that in the event of 
a breakdown the traffic could still continue in both directions. 
The tunnel would be built to continental loading gauge which is 
The estimated tunnel cost, allowing for inflation, is however £846 
million. 
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wider than that of the United Kingdom, and the traction system 
used would be the continental 25kV overhead system. In the United 
Kingdom a new railway route using 25 kV overhead and the continental 
loading gauge would be constructed to a new terminal in London. 
For ferry trains, the total time for the journey between one .. port 
and the other would be about one hour, of which 35 minutes would 
be spent in travelling. 
20. Initially, Inter-City train services would become possible from 
London to Paris and Brussels but this could be readily extended to 
Germany and other countries. The Railway administrations have pro-
posed an initial freight container train network tha·c vmuld stretch 
from Glasgow to points as distant as Madrid, Milan and Vienna. 
Further details may be summarized under the following heads:-
Finance 
21. The British Channel Tunnel Company Limited and the Societe Francaise 
du Tunnel sous la Manche would raise all the capital required -
about 90o/o through the issue of fixed-interest bonds, guaranteed 
by the two Governments and the remainder by the issue of shares in 
the Companies. For the first 50 years the profits of the Tunnel 
would be shared by the Companies and by the two Governments. 
After 50 years the profits would go entirely to the two Governments. 
Organization 
22. The responsibility for raising the necessary finance and constructing 
the Tunnel will rest with the two companies mentioned above. On 
completion, the Companies will hand over the Tunnel to the two 
Governments who will in turn transfer it to an Anglo-French authority 
for management as a commercial enterprise competing with other means 
of cross-channel transport. 
The cost 
23. The total cost of building the Tunnel, as mentioned in para. 18 above, 
is estimated at 1973 prices at £464 million - to be borne equally 
between the United Kingdom and France; the outturn costs, which 
allow for inflation, interest and financing charges, are currently 
estimated at £846 million. 
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The return 
24. The rate of return in real terms on the project as a whole should 
be between 14% and 17% and ~n 1973 the then UK Government believed that 
the higher figure was the more likely1 
The benefits 
25. It has been estimated that the revenues from the Tunnel would 
result in the high initial costs of the tunnel being covered 
2 
by 1989 , and the benefit to UK passengers alone is estimated 
at £18 million in 1980 rising to £33 million in 1990. Freight 
traffic through the tunnel should benefit the UK economy by 
some £3.3 million in 1980 rising to £6.6 million by 1990. 
The effects of the Tunnel on passengers 
26. The Tunnel should benefit passengers both in journey time and in 
charges. The following table based on the most recent studies shows 
the effect that the Tunnel may be expected to have on certain journey 
times, with and without high speed trains : 
tunnel 
Journey 1973 1980 + (tunnel) 
very high speed 
London - Cologne 
London - Amsterdam 
London - Brussels 
London - Paris 
lOh 
9h 
7h 
7h 
16' 
28' 
04' 
05' 
5h 29 1 
I 
5h 37 
3h 18' 
3h 47' 
27. The effects of the Tunnel on Ferry Operations 
3h 35 
3h 35' 
2h 15' 
2h 40' 
The Tunnel will certainly exercise a profound effect upon ferry 
operations. It is expected for example that Hovercraft Services 
between Dover/Folkestone-Calais/Boulogne will cease entirely, 
and that by 1980 the number of accompanied vehicles for the 
French Straits with the Tunnel will be some 300,000 whereas 
without the Tunnel it would amount to about 1,500,000- the figure 
for 1971 being 700,000. The most dramatic reduction expressed 
in percentages is for the French Straits, but other crossings 
such as Harwich-Hook will be affected to a greater or lesser 
degree - sometimes as in the case of Harwich-Hook by as much as 
63% by 1990. The crossing which will suffer least for 
passengers and vehicles is Southampton-Le Havre/Cherbourg which 
1 
"The Channel Tunnel", September 1973, Command 5430, London HMSO 
2 The Channel Tunnel: a United Kingdom Transport Cost Benefit Study, 
HMSO 1973 
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is expected to maintain an absolute increase in passenger numbers. 
28. Air passenger traffic is expected to suffer a 14% reduction by 
1980. 
The effects of the Tunnel on Freight Traffic 
29. The position here too is similar. For both roll-on/roll -off 
and container freight there will be either a diminished rate of 
increase or an absolute decline (Dover/Folkstone for example 
will handle, it is estimated, 1,630,000 tons in 1980 without the 
tunnel but only 640,000 with it. By 1990 these figures would be 
respectively near 3,000,000 and 1,000,000. 
Social Effects 
30. As far as employment is concerned Dover and Calais are likely to 
suffer from some cut back in ferry and port employment. The effect 
of opening the tunnel will be to reduce the number so employed 
by 1,000 in the case of Dover. By 1991 there are likely to be 
4,000 less jobs available in Dover than there would be if the 
Tunnel is not built. Equally the natural development likely at 
other ports will remain in check from the construction of the 
Channel Tunnel. On the other hand the tunnel will itself create 
a number of new jobs though a considerable proportion of these 
l 
might not be suitable for those leaving shipping or port employment. 
The committee are hopeful that the eventual benefits arising trom the 
construction of the Tunnel will outweigh, in terms of employment, any 
initial disadvantages. 
31. Roll-on/roll-off freight traffic is expected to increase at all ports 
but the rate of increase will be slowed down by the Tunnel. 
32. passenger ferry fleets on the short French Straits crossings will 
probably not need to be increased in size between now and 1980 
and it is likely that once the Tunnel is opened there will be 
smaller fleets, possibly operating larger ships. 
l 
The Channel Tunnel, Cmnd. 5430, p. 65 
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III. TRANSPORT LINKS WITH THE DANISH ISLANDS 
33. Permanent transport links between the many islandsof Denmark 
are of the greatest importance to the economic development of that 
country and for the development of some of its regions. 
34. A number of these transport links are also of great importance 
to traffic between Denmark and the rest of the Community and also 
between Denmark and Sweden. What is knownas the 'Vogelfluglinie' 
(Beeline), as well as the links between Jutland and Sweden via 
Funen and Seeland are of importance to all of Europe, as they provide 
the link between the Scandinavian peninsula and the Western 
European continent. In the context of European travel Denmark 
plays an important bridging function for all the other countries 
concerned. 
Existing Bridges and Tunnels 
35. At present there are 14 important bridges over inlets of the sea 
in Denmark and one tunnel, as shown in the following table: 
Number 
on att-
ached 
map. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
SOURCE: 
Existing permanent transport links across inlets of 
the sea in Denmark 
Name 
Number 
of 
traffic 
lanes 
Oddesund Bridge 2 
Vildsund Bridge 2 
Number 
of 
railway 
tracks 
Limfjord Railway Bridge 1 
Limfjord Road Bridge 4 
Limfjord Tunnel 6 
New bridge over the 6 
Little Belt 
Old bridge over the 
Little Belt 
Sonderburg Bridge 
Svendborg Bridge 
Siosund Bridge 
Langeland Bridge 
2 
2 
4 
2 
2 
Lange Bridge 6 
Ulvsund Bridge 2 
2 
1 
Storstrom Bridge 2 1 
Nykobing Bridge 2 
Length 
in 
metres 
532 
308 
403 
640 
510 
1700 
1177 
324 
947 
540 
704 
380 
696 
319C? 
310 
Year 
opened 
1938 
1939 
1938 
1933 
1969 
1970 
1935 
1930 
1966 
1957 
1962 
1954 
1943 
1937 
1962 
Ministeriet for offentlige Arbejder 
(Ministry of Transport) Information 
(Trafikministeriet) 
issued nn 22 March 1g74 
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36. Some of the bridges and tunnels listed in the first table are 
only of regional importance. The following, however, are of 
national and European importance: 
- the Vildsund Bridge (2) and the railway (3) and road (4) bridges 
over the Limfjord form part of the link between Central Europe 
and the ferryports of Frederikshavn and Hirtshals with their 
ferries to Sweden and Norway (European Highway 3) . 
- the new (6) and old (7) bridges over the Little Belt form part 
of the most important links between the east and west of 
Denmark itself and consequently are part of the link between 
Central Europe and the Scandinavian peninsula via Jutland, 
FUnen and Seeland (European Highway 66). 
- The Storstrom Bridge (14) forms part of the so-called 'Vogel-
fluglinie' (Beeline), the shortest link between Central 
Europe and the Scandinavian peninsula (European Highway 4.) 
Projected Bridges and Tunnels 
37. While no permanent link is planned at present between the Danish 
island of Laaland and the German island of Fehmarn over the 
Fehmarn Sound, the eight projects listed in the following table 
are either being built or planned: 
Number 
on att-
ached 
map 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
SOURCE: 
Permanent transport links over sea inlets in Denmark and 
between Denmark and Sweden being built or planned 
Number Number 
of of Length Projected 
traffic railway in year of 
lanes tracks metres opening 
Sallingsund Bridge 4 1700 1977 
Vejle-Fjord Bridge 4 1700 1979 
Als-Sund Bridge 4 850 1980 
Bridge over the Great 
Belt 6 2 11500 1982 
Guldborgsund Bridge 4 1220 1983 
Faro Bridges 4 2280 1983 
Railway Tunnel 
Helsingor-Helsingborg 1 8900 1985 
Motorway tunnel and 6 1500 1985 
Motorway bridge from 
Copenhagen to Malmo 6 6400 1985 
Ministeriet for offentlige Arbejder (Trafikministeriet) 
(Ministry of Transport) Information issued on 22 March 1974 
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38. Of the projects listed in the second table, the first (16) is being 
built, while the others are in various stages of planning. While 
two of the projects are of more local importance (16 and 18), the 
others are of great national and European significance. 
The Vejle-Fjorde-Bridge (17) is part of the planned motorway which 
is to replace European Highway 3 and will bring the entire north 
of JUtland and the ferryports of Hirtshals and Frederikshavn with 
their ferries to Norway and Sweden closer to Central and Western 
Europe. 
The bridge over the Great Belt will completely change the most 
important link between east and west in Denmark and will bring 
about a significant improvement in the links between Central 
Europe and Sweden, via JUtland, Funen and Seeland (European 
Highway 66) . 
The Guldborgsun Bridge (20) and the Faro Bridges (21) are part 
of the motorway being planned to replace the existing European 
Highway 4; part of this motorway is already in use and part 
is still being built. These· bridges and the motorway will bring 
about a significant improvement in the 'Vogelfluglinie' (Beeline) 
between Central Europe and Denmark and the Scandinavian 
Peninsula. 
The permanent links now planned over the Oresund will carry traffic 
on the "Vogelfluglinie" as well as on the link between Central 
Europe and the Scandinavian Peninsuia via Jutland, Funen and 
,, 
Seeland. It has now been decided to build a railway tunnel at the 
northern end of the Oresund (22) as well as a tunnel between the 
islands of Amager and Saltholm and a bridge from Saltholm to the 
Swedish mainland (23), all of which will carry a six-lane motorway 
from Copenhagen to Malm6. The Oresund links will bring the future 
vision of an integrated centre of economic activity on both 
sides of the Oresund one step closer to reality. 
National and European priorities 
39. In all projects in Denmark a clear distinction must be drawn between 
regional aspects and the aspects of European through-travel. It is 
true that in making cost benefit analyses of all projects, the two 
aspects may be grouped together on the credit side; however, the 
priorities are different for each of the two aspects. For Denmark 
itself, for instance, the link over the Great Belt is more important 
by far than the link provided by the'Vogelfluglinie,' whereas 
18 PE 36·642/fin. 
Germany and Sweden are clearly much more interested in the Vogelflug-
linie: The planned bridge over the Vejlefjord is also more important 
for Denmark than the motorway bridges of the'Vogelfluglinie.' 
40. The Vejle project is, in fact, at a very advanced stage already: 
in March 1974 all the documentation for the call for tenders had 
been prepared. The bridge is to be ready by 1979. 
The timing of the other projects is also in line with their importance 
to the Danish economy: the bridge over the Great Belt is to be ready 
by 1982, the decision to build it having recently been taken in the 
Folketing. 
Construction work is now in progress on the motorway bridges on the 
'Vogelfluglinie' -the Guldborgsund Bridge and the Faro• Bridges; 
both bridges are to be ready at the same time, that is, by 1983. 
41. According to present plans the Oresund bridges and tunnel will not 
be ready until two years later (1985). An agreemer•t has already been 
I 
signed between the Danish and Swedish governments. This agreement 
has meanwhile been ratified by the Swedish parliament, but not 
as yet by the Danish parliament. 
Position in Danish Infrastructure Planning 
42. The Danish projects for new bridges and tunnels are incorporated into 
an overall plan for the extension of major highways, which is to 
give the country an H-shaped motorway network. From the German 
border into the south to Limfjord near Aalborg in the north, a 
north-south motorway is planned: it will run mainly along the east 
coast (with the greatest concentration of population and industry). 
The plan for a Central Jutland motorway has been finally turned 
down. The 'Vogelfluglinie' will form a second north-south axis 
in the east of the country and run from the ferryport of Rodbyhavn 
to Copenhagen by way of the islands of Laaland, Falster and Seeland. 
The 'crossbar of the H' will run from the Kolding/Fredericia area 
via the Little Belt bridges, Funen and the new bridges over the 
Great Belt to Seeland, linking up with the'Vogelfluglinie'near 
the east coast in the vicinity of Koge. 
43. Apart from access ramps, no additional work needs to be done on the 
railways in connection with the new bridges and tunnels. 
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Position in European Infrastructure Planning 
44. The Oresund bridge and tunnel projects will require some infra-
stfucture planning in Sweden; bilateral negotiations are in 
progress between Denmark and Sweden. 
45. The German Federal Republic is the other country principally con-
cerned. It would be highly desirable for the corresponding 
connections in the Federal Republic to be completed when the 
various tunnels and bridges in Denmark are opened. 
46. As far as road construction is concerned there is close co-operation 
between the Danish and German authorities. According to existing 
plans it can be expected that the highways on both sides of the 
frontier will be ready by 1978. 
The German motorway, which is to be a continuation of the E 4, 
should be ready at the same time as the Faro Bridges and the 
Guldborg Bridge as well as the Danish motorway from Rodbyhavn 
to Copenhagen. Unfortunately, however, an extension of the 
E 4 motorway in Germany seems only to be planned as far as the 
vicinity of Oldenburg in Holstein and not as far as Puttgarde 
(the ferryport of the Vogelfluglinie1. 
47. A further extension of the German Federal railway to the north 
of Hamburg does not seeem to be planned at present. 
48. The Community institutions should obviously play a coordinating 
role in this matter. 
I~ The Messina Link 
49. The idea of bridging the Straits of Messina, thus establishing 
a permanent link between Sicily and the mainland of Italy, 
l 
has been under consideration for over a hundred years and in 1971 
the Italian Parliament passed an enabling bill 1 which makes 
Legge 17 dicembre 1971, n. 1158, Collegamento viario e ferroviario 
fra la Sicilia ed il continen'te. 
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detailed provision for the financing, construction and control 
of a road and rail link between Sicily and the mainland, though 
it does not lay down whether this should be effected by means of 
a bridge or a tunnel. This Act established a company, the 
majority sharehold of which is the Institute for Industrial 
Reconstruction (IRI), who are charged with carrying out the 
preliminary studies and construction of such a link, which is 
described in Article 1 of the Act as "opera di prevalente interesse 
nazionale" - a work of outstanding national importance. Despite 
the urgency implied by this expression and despite the fact that 
it is now more than two years sincP. the Act was passed, no steps 
h b k . . f 1 ave een ta en to g1ve 1t e feet. 
50. The Committee on Regional Policy and Transport agree with the Italian 
Parliament's estimate of the importance of this work, which in their 
opinion should be started without delay. From a technical point 
of view, there do not appear to be any overwhelming difficulties 
in the construction of either a bridge or tunnel. A bridge would 
not need to be of great length, the distance for example between 
Punta Pezzo in Calabria and Punta Faro in Sicily, which are suitable 
locations, being only some 2780 metres. Oreof the engineers who worked 
on the ,Bosphorous b}idge which was opened on 20 October last and 
which is some 1560 metres long, has stated that such a bridge is 
not only technically possible but that it does not create any 
2 particular problems. 
51. The cost of such a bridge (or tunnel) would be high. One recent 
3 
estimate has put it in the region of 1000 milliard lire, or 
perhaps 2000 milliard lire when the necessary supporting road 
and rail links are taken into account. But however high these 
costs, it would seem that there are various financial groups who 
would be prepared to underwrite the cost of whatever project is 
finally selected in return for a concessionary interest for a 
number of years. The Committee would also point out that the 
project, if financially viable, could also be financed in the 
manner described in para. 21 above for the Channel Tunnel by a 
1 A detailed account of the various projects, their cost, etc. has been 
provided by Senator Oscar Ando', who has long been a keen proponent 
of the Messina link,in his 1971 publication "Le piu Recente Vicende del 
"Ponte Sullo Stretto". 
2 Carriere d~lla Sera, 12 Nov.l973 Compare with this statement the Danish 
bridges of 3.2 km constructed in 1937 and of 11.5 km planned for 1982. 
3 Estimate by Prof. Vincenzo Correnti, Director of the Transport Institute 
of the University of Palermo. 
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mixture of risk capital and government secured loans. 
Financial Viability 
52. The Committee, for reasons that will be discussed below (see para. 54 ) 
do not consider that this is a question which should be discussed 
solely in terms of financial viability, but they recognise fully 
the importance of this aspect. 
53. At the moment, all goods and passengers moving between Sicily 
and the mainland have to use either sea or air and the volume of 
traffic is constantly increasing. Sicilian ports handled a total 
tonnage of more than 40 million tons in 1965, by 1972 this figure 
had risen to over 60 million tons. For the same period, passenger 
traffic through the ports rose from over 600,000 to over 1 million 
per year. If the actual minimum distance between Sicily and the 
mainland is 3 km, this distance can be expressed in terms of time 
\ 
lost as a minimum distance of 150 kms, and of course it is corres-
pondingly longer when ports other than Messina are considered. 
Port facilities in Sicily are becoming increasingly congested 
and there would seem to be no doubt that a road and rail link would 
not only relieve this congestion but wduld greatly reduce transport 
costs to the benefit of the Sicilian economy whether imports or 
exports are being considered. 
Social Necessity 
54. The delegation of the Committee on Regional Policy and Transport 
which visited Sicily in 1973 were convinced of the need for a 
permanent link between Sicily and the rest of Italy for reasons 
other than purely financial. They noted a very real sense of 
social isolation in Sicily, a sense of "apartness" which to 
some extent can be explained by physical isolation, though of 
course more in terms of economic backwardness. This economic 
backwardness could be alleviated by an improvement of the 
physical contacts between Island and mainland, but the delegation 
were also impressed by the present inadequacy of the Sicilian 
transport infrastructure which in itself is a serious impediment 
to the economic and social development of the island. 
55. The inadequate road structure and the docking and rail system 
would seem in any case to demand improvement, but if a 
permanent link is constructed this will become imperative. 
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1 
1 It has already been proposed that there should be two motorway 
rings constructed - an external coast-line road, with frequent 
links to a parallel internal motorway. Such a scheme has obvious 
attractions. It would help avoid excessive industrial concentration 
on Sicily's coast-line with consequential dam~ge to Sicilian tourist 
potential, while at the same time it would help to develop the 
depopulated interior both industrially and agriculturally. But 
in the Committee's opinion it would be disastrous if such plans 
were developed without reference to a bridge or tunnel from Messina 
to Regio calabria, only in this way will potential traffic duplication 
between road and rail be avoided, or both, and expensive alteration 
become necessary when the link is, as the Committee is convinced it 
will be, finally built. For this reason alone, a firm decision 
and a start on the project is, in our opinion, necessary without 
delay. 
Vincenzo Correnti, Director of the Transport Institute, Engineering 
Faculty, University of Palermo. 2/3 March-May 1973 
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A CASE HISTORY 
V. THE SEVERN BRIDGE 
56. A recent example of a link between two communities is afforded 
by the Severn Bridge which since 1966 has connected the South 
West of England with South Wales. While there had been plans 
for such a bridge from 1810 onwards, it was not finally opened 
until 1966 though a rail tunnel has been in operation since 
1886. The bridge, a toll bridge, which carries only road traffic 
can save nearly 50 miles in travelling distance and its effect 
on the two communities it links has been considerable. A 
research project on the effects of the bridge was commissioned 
by the Department of Economic Affairs in association with the 
Welsh Office. 1 
51. This study made possible a comparison between estimates of the 
effect that the bridge would have and the actual outcome. 
It is perhaps significant that the main effect was in fact in 
the sector of the private motorist, particularly at first. Industry -
particularly the manufacturing industry, was not heavily affected, 
although there was a considerable change in the pattern of the 
distributary trades. At the same time the construction of the 
bridge enabled a number of firms to employ staff from significantly 
greater distances than had been possible before. 
58. An anticipated switch from rail freight occurred but it is hard to 
assess the significance of this in view of the railways own wish 
to "hive off" certain less attractive traffic. The railway 
certainly retained its traffic in steel products. 
59. If the most obvious impact of the bridge has so far been in the 
social sphere - weekend trips, a greater facility for returning 
home in the case of those working on the other side of the Bristol 
1 
European Conference of Ministers responsible for regional planning -
effects of transport infrastructure on regional development -
the economic impact of the Severn Bridge - a Case Study, Council of 
Europe, 1973. 
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Channel and so on, one thing that does emerge from the case study 
is that the role of the national government is probably at least as 
significant in shaping the development of industry by incentive 
grants and so on, as the new transport infrastructure itself. 
If the Severn Bridge has changed the leisure pattern of individuals, 
it has had comparatively little effect on the general industrial 
scene, although, for example, the town of Gloucester which had 
previously served as the pivot between SoUh Wales and the South 
West of England, has certainly experienced a decline it is dis-
tributary role. Against this, however, must be taken into account 
the environmental benefits which Gloucester (and other towns on the 
old land rouJe)have experienced as a result of a decline in 
through traffic. 
60. The example of the Severn Bridge also serves to illustrate the 
detailed attention that is necessary when such projects are 
under consideration to such matters as ~pporting route surfaces, 
which have been considerably affected by changed traffic movement. 
61. On the assumption that there will be no further traffic growth 
on the Severn Bridge beyond 2000 and on the most severe set of 
assumptions - a 10% discount rate - the bridge, which cost some 
£21.5 million will show a net benefit- to all classes of users-
of virtually £100 million. The lessons learnt from the Severn 
Bridge would seem to be that change may be much greater than 
than estimated nr: that traffic growth may be spread over several 
years, developing most rapidly among private motorists: and that 
the areas affected will not be confined to those immediately 
connected. The report concludes "the potential pay~off from 
this type of investment is very great even on conservative 
tests ... " 
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